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JUSTICE SCALIA ON THE USE OF FOREIGN LAW IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: UNIDIRECTIONAL
MONOLOGUE OR CO-CONSTITUTIVE DIALOGUE?
Melissa A. Waters'
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Supreme Court's 2003-2004
Term was the relative absence of debate among the Justices on what has
become, over the past few years, a perennial hot topic on the Court's
calendar: the relevance of foreign legal materials in interpreting the rights
granted to Americans under the United States Constitution. In the past
few years, several members of the Court have shown increased interest in
considering foreign sources of law in constitutional analysis.' This Term in
Roper v. Simmons,' the Court will again have an opportunity to debate the
appropriateness of foreign precedent in constitutional analysis, when it
revisits the issue whether the juvenile death penalty amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment.

t This is an edited transcript of a presentation delivered as part of the 2004 University of
Tulsa College of Law Symposium: InternationalLaw and the 2003-04 Supreme Court Term:
Building Bridges or Constructing Barriers Between National, Foreign, and International
Law?
1. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (striking down state laws permitting
execution of the mentally retarded, holding that these executions no longer comported with
"evolving standards of decency" and thus violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment. In its discussion of "evolving standards of decency," the
Court noted the overwhelming world-wide consensus among courts and foreign legislatures
prohibiting execution of mentally retarded individuals.) See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003) (expanding the Court's consideration of foreign legal precedent beyond the
context of the Eighth Amendment. In striking down state laws prohibiting homosexual
intimate conduct, the Court discussed at length both European Court of Human Rights
decisions and foreign legislation permitting the conduct in question.).
2. 124 S. Ct. 2198 (2004) (mem.) (pending a decision after oral arguments were heard by
the Supreme Court on Oct. 13, 2004).
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What is the impetus behind the Court's recent interest in the use of
foreign law in interpreting the U.S. Constitution? In my view, it is in large
part the Justices' response to the development of what I call transnational
judicial dialogue:3 national, supranational, and international courts from
Australia to Zimbabwe are increasingly citing and discussing at length
foreign legal precedent on a wide range of legal issues, particularly
constitutional law issues. Over time, these interactions among the world's
courts have developed into a kind of transnational judicial dialogue, in
which courts are using comparative legal analysis to engage in intellectual
cross-fertilization of ideas - or, as Anne-Marie Slaughter has described it,
a "process4 of collective judicial deliberation on a set of common
problems.,
The increased interest in foreign sources of law on the part of several
U.S. Supreme Court Justices seems to reflect a desire to participate in this
emerging transnational judicial dialogue - in short, to become active
participants in a kind of judicial conversation with their foreign
counterparts. Importantly, the trend seems to have attracted the interest
of both liberals and moderates on the Court. Justice O'Connor, for
example, has long been one of the most outspoken proponents of the
relevance of foreign court decisions in the Court's jurisprudence. In
Lawrence v. Texas,5 Justice Kennedy discussed foreign precedent and
practice in his majority opinion, striking down U.S. homosexual sodomy
laws.6
Of course, this growing interest on the Court in transnational judicial
dialogue has not been without its detractors. Some conservative members
of the Court have repeatedly cried foul over the use of foreign sources of
law in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence.' In addition, recently the
debate has moved from judicial and academic circles to the halls of
Congress. The House of Representatives is considering a resolution that
would express the sense of the Congress that judicial determinations by

3. See generally Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of
TransnationalJudicial Dialogue in Creatingand Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J.
2 (2005) (discussing the development of transnational judicial dialogue and its role in
shaping international legal norms) [hereinafter Mediating Norms].
4. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L.
REV. 99, 119 (1994).
5. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
6. Id. at 573, 576-77.
7. Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion wrote, "Constitutional entitlements do not spring
into existence ... because foreign nations decriminalize conduct." Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent. Id. at 598.
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U.S. courts regarding the meaning of U.S. laws should not be based in any
way on foreign legal sources.'
In its 2003-2004 Term, however, the Court was virtually silent on this
important and growing debate over its own participation in transnational
judicial dialogue. As this Symposium makes clear, last Term was certainly
unprecedented in the Supreme Court's consideration of important foreign
relations and international law issues. But there was no major case last
Term in which the Court debated the appropriateness of considering
foreign legal materials in constitutional analysis.
Justice Scalia appears to have developed such a keen interest in this
debate that he sought out opportunities last Term to keep the issue alive,
both in the Court's case law and at the forefront of scholarly debate. On at
least three occasions last Term, Justice Scalia seized the opportunity to
declare his unequivocal opposition to any use of foreign sources of law in
interpreting the rights granted to Americans under the U.S. Constitution.9
But perhaps more surprisingly, Justice Scalia also urged the Court to take
foreign judicial decisions much more seriously than the other Justices
seemed to believe was warranted in the area of treaty interpretation.10 I
will discuss each of these instances in turn.
Justice Scalia denounced the use of foreign sources of law in
constitutional analysis in his concurring opinion last Term in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain.1 At issue in Sosa was whether the Alien Tort Claims
Act granted a private right of action to individuals for torts in violation of
the law of nations." Justice Scalia devoted a portion of his concurring

8. H.R. 568,108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004):
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that judicial
determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of the United States
should not be based in whole or in part on judgments, laws, or
pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments,
laws, or pronouncements are incorporated into the legislative history of
laws passed by the elected legislative branches of the United States or
otherwise inform an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of
the United States.
9. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, Keynote
address to the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law (March 31April 3, 2004), in 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 305 (2004) [hereinafter Foreign Legal
Authority]; see also Olympic Airways v. Husain, 124 S. Ct. 1221, 1230 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
10. See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 124 S. Ct. 2065, 1231 (2004).
11. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
12. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, The Supreme Court Meets InternationalLaw: What's the Sequel
to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain?, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 77 (2004) (remarks in this
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opinion to decrying the judicial and scholarly trend toward using evidence
of foreign practice (in the guise of customary international law) in
interpreting constitutional rights. He commented, "[tihe notion that a law
of nations, redefined to mean the consensus of states on any subject, can
be used by a private citizen to control a sovereign's treatment of its own
citizens within its own territory is a 20th-century invention of
internationalist law professors and human-rights advocates., 13 Justice
Scalia continued, "[t]he Framers would, I am confident, be appalled by the
proposition that, for example, the American peoples' democratic adoption
of the death penalty ...could be judicially nullified because of the
disapproving views of foreigners. 1 4 He concluded, "American law-the
law made by the people's democratically elected representatives-does
not recognize a category of activity that is so universally disapproved by
other nations that it is automatically unlawful here."'"
In his remarks at the American Society of International Law
Conference (ASIL) in March 2004, Justice Scalia elaborated his position
opposing U.S. court participation in transnational judicial dialogue on
constitutional issues. 6 In his keynote address, Justice Scalia offered sharp
criticism of what he clearly sees as a dangerous trend toward importing
foreign legal norms into U.S. constitutional analysis. Justice Scalia
acknowledged that he is, in fact, one of the Court's strongest proponents of
the use of some foreign legal sources. He noted, "I probably use more
foreign legal materials than anyone else on the Court .... Of course they

are all fairly old foreign legal materials, and they are all English., 17 But as
for the use of contemporary foreign legal materials-for example, recent
foreign judicial decisions or legislation-Justice Scalia again took the firm
position that such materials, in his words, "can never be relevant to an
interpretation of-to the meaning of-the U.S. Constitution."'"
He
complained:
If there was any thought absolutely foreign to the founders of our
country, surely it was the notion that we Americans should be governed
the way Europeans are.... What reason is there to believe that other

issue); William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal
System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87 (2004) (remarks in

this issue).
13. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2776.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Foreign Legal Authority, supra note 9, at 305.
17. Id. at 306.
18. Id. at 307.
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dispositions of a foreign country are so obviously suitable to the morals
and manners of our people that they can be judicially imposed through
constitutional adjudication? Is it really an appropriate function of
judges to say which are and which are not?"
Justice Scalia concluded, "[c]omparative study is useful ... not as a
convenient means of facilitating judicial updating of the U.S. Constitution,
but as a source of example and experience that we may use,
appropriate,
laws-or
democratically, to change our f .,
,20 even, if it is
..
democratically to change our Constitution."
When, if ever, does Justice Scalia consider it appropriate for U.S.
courts to consult foreign sources of law? His answer: when they are
interpreting a treaty to which the United States is a party. Justice Scalia
emphasized this point last Term in his dissent in Olympic Airways v.
21
Husain. In Olympic Airways, a passenger died of an asthma attack on a
flight between Cairo and New York, after a flight attendant refused his
request to be moved away from the smoking section. His widow sued the
airline for wrongful death under the Warsaw Convention, to which the
United States is a signatory." The question before the Supreme Court was
whether the flight attendant's refusal to move the passenger, and his
subsequent death, constituted an "accident" within the meaning of Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention. 2'
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that the flight
attendant's conduct constituted an accident under Article 17. Two courts
from other signatories to the Warsaw Convention (Australia and the
United Kingdom) had held that factually similar cases did not constitute
accidents within the meaning of Article 17. These cases appeared to be
directly at odds with the Court's interpretation of the treaty provision. But
the Court dismissed these foreign court judgments in a brief footnote, in
part on the ground that these were decisions of foreign intermediate
appellate courts, and that the courts of last resort in Australia and the UK
24
had not yet addressed the issue.
In his dissent in Olympic Airways, Justice Scalia took the majority to.
task for failing to give sufficient consideration to foreign court decisions in

19. Id. at 310.
20. Id.

dissenting).
21. 124 S. Ct. 1221 (Scalia, J.,
22. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
23. 124 S. Ct. at 1221.
24. Id. at 1229.
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interpreting the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. He complained,
"[t]oday's decision stands out for its failure to give any serious
consideration to how the courts of our treaty partners have resolved the
legal issues before us." 2 5 He again criticized those who would use foreign
law in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, commenting:
This sudden insularity is striking, since the Court in recent years has
canvassed the prevailing law in other nations (at least Western
European nations) to determine the meaning of an American
Constitution that those nations had no part in framing and that those
nations' courts have no role in enforcing. One would have thought that
foreign courts' interpretations of a treaty that their governments
adopted jointly with ours, and that they have an26actual role in applying,
would be (to put it mildly) all the more relevant.
Justice Scalia emphasized the important role that comparative
analysis should play in ensuring consistent interpretation and development
of international treaties. He noted:
We can, and should, look to decisions of other signatories when we
interpret treaty provisions ....

[I]t is reasonable to impute to the parties

an intent that their respective courts strive to interpret the treaty
consistently....
Finally, even if we disagree, we surely owe the
conclusions reached by appellate courts of other signatories the courtesy
27
of respectful consideration.
What is surprising about Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Olympic
Airways is the great weight that he suggested U.S. courts should give to the
judgments of other signatories' courts. Justice Scalia complained that the
Court was adopting an interpretation of the Warsaw Convention that
stood squarely at odds with the earlier interpretation of the UK and
Australian courts.'8 He argued, "[w]ere we confronting the issue in the
first instance, perhaps the Court could persuade me to its view. But courts
in two other countries have already rejected it, and their reasoning is no
less compelling than the Court's., 29 In these circumstances, Justice Scalia
explained, "I would follow the holdings of . . [the Australian and UK
courts], since the Court's analysis today is no more convincing than
theirs.""'

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 1230 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1231.
Olympic Airways, 124 S. Ct. at 1234.
Id. at 1233.
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In Olympic Airways, Justice Scalia thus appears to propose a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the validity of foreign court judgments
in matters of treaty interpretation. Thus, if a court of another signatory
country has already addressed an issue of treaty interpretation, U.S. courts
should defer to that judgment so long as it is a reasonable interpretation of
the treaty-even if there are other, equally reasonable alternative
interpretations. The foreign court's interpretation should control unless
the U.S. court can offer, in Justice Scalia's words, a "convincing
explanation" 31 for its decision to depart from the foreign court's prior
judgment. In this particular case, however, it seems somewhat odd that
Justice Scalia insisted that the Court should have deferred to the foreign
courts' prior decisions in interpreting the Warsaw Convention. As the
majority pointed out, the foreign decisions were merely the views
expressed by intermediate appellate courts in the UK and in Australia, and
the highest courts in those countries had not yet addressed the proper
32
interpretation of the treaty.
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Olympic Airways was an
important step in promoting his broader agenda. In my view, Justice
Scalia used Olympic Airways, along with his opinion in Alvarez-Machain33
and his comments at the ASIL Conference, as vehicles to call attention to
what he clearly sees as a singularly disturbing trend. In his comments last
Term, Justice Scalia was decrying the agenda of those whom he describes
as "Platonic living constitutionalists": 34 scholars and judges who would use
comparative legal analysis as a means to import foreign legal norms into
the American Constitution, and who would, in Justice Scalia's view, make
over the American people in the image of the Europeans. Just as
importantly, in his dissent in Olympic Airways, Justice Scalia seized the
opportunity to criticize (rightly, in my opinion) the Court's decidedly
casual, ad hoc approach thus far to the use of foreign legal sources in its
decision-making.
Justice Scalia's comments last Term also suggest that he sees great
urgency in sounding the alarm on this issue. Indeed, he suggests that the
battle might already be lost. In his keynote address at the ASIL
conference, for example, he acknowledged that the Court's use of foreign
law in the interpretation of the Constitution would likely continue "at an
accelerating pace."35 In fact, he described the use of foreign law in the

31. Id. at 1231.
32. Id.at 1229.
33. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. 2739.

34. Foreign Legal Authority, supra note 9, at 308.
35. Id.
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Court's constitutional jurisprudence as "the wave of the future."36 But
Justice Scalia's apparent "last stand" on this issue seems premature at best.
In comparison with other constitutional courts around the world, the U.S.
Supreme Court, thus far, has taken extremely modest steps toward using
foreign legal materials in any of its decision-making, much less in its
constitutional decisions. There is no question, however, that Justice
Scalia's comments last Term have been very effective in raising the
visibility of this issue and in rallying conservative scholars, judges, and
lawmakers to the cause.
Apart from their rhetorical value, Justice Scalia's remarks last Term
also raise intriguing questions regarding the nascent debate over the U.S.
Supreme Court's participation in the emerging transnational judicial
dialogue among the world's courts. For example, was Justice Scalia
attempting to develop a conservative alternative approach to transnational
judicial dialogue?
Drawing on remarks, the conservative alternative
approach appears to consist of the following maxims. First, foreign sources
of law "can never be relevant to an interpretation of-to the meaning ofthe U.S. Constitution., 37 Thus, under a conservative alternative approach,
U.S. courts cannot participate at all in transnational judicial dialogue on
any matter of constitutional law. On the other hand, when the United
States is a signatory to a treaty, the decisions of other signatory courts
deserve a strong presumption of validity. Indeed, U.S. courts should defer
to foreign judicial interpretations in such instances, so long as those
interpretations seem reasonable.3" Thus, the conservative alternative
approach envisions a very active role for U.S. courts in transnational
judicial dialogue in the context of treaty interpretation.
In short, Justice Scalia's conservative alternative approach would not
reject all forms of participation in transnational judicial dialogue, but it
would severely restrict that participation. Indeed, his approach would
eliminate it entirely in matters of constitutional law; an area that is fast
becoming one of the most important and active areas of dialogue among
the world's courts.
Justice Scalia's remarks raise a second intriguing question. In what is
clearly becoming an increasingly politically charged debate, would a
conservative alternative approach to transnational judicial dialogue win
support from the other Justices on the Court? Given the political backlash
that may be building against the Court's relatively modest attempts to

36. Id. at 309.
37. Id. at 307.

38. See supra note 27-31 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's dissent in
Olympic Airways).
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consider foreign sources of law, is it likely that Justice Scalia's limited
approach to dialogue will win back the moderates on the Court-Justice
Kennedy, and perhaps even Justice O'Connor?
It remains to be seen whether Justice Scalia will continue to elaborate
a conservative approach to U.S. court participation in transnational
judicial dialogue and what impact such an approach would have on the
Court's jurisprudence, but we can begin to evaluate both the practicality
and the wisdom of Justice Scalia's suggested approach. First, in my view,
Justice Scalia and other conservative judges and scholars raise important
concerns regarding U.S. court participation in transnational judicial
dialogue on constitutional issues. For example, they correctly criticize the
somewhat ad hoc approach to comparative constitutional analysis adopted
by the Supreme Court thus far.3 9 In Lawrence v. Texas,40 for example, the
Court's discussion of foreign precedent and practice could have benefited
from a more rigorous analytical approach. The majority cited decisions
from the European Court of Human Rights, as well as legislation from
several countries that supported its view that homosexual sodomy laws
were unconstitutional.4 ' But it did not elaborate upon the reasoning of the
European Court of Human Rights in striking down these laws. Nor did it
explain why the practices of certain countries were more relevant to the
U.S. experience than the many countries around the world who continue
to have laws in place prohibiting homosexual sodomy. The majority's
it
approach in Lawrence made it vulnerable to the dissent's criticism that
4
1
was merely imposing "foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.
Moreover, there may be a problem of selection bias in the Court's
approach to transnational judicial dialogue on constitutional issues. While
it is too early to draw any firm conclusions, recent cases indicate that the
Court may exhibit a tendency to pick and choose certain categories of
cases in which it wishes to discuss foreign sources of law at length, while
ignoring foreign sources of law altogether in certain other categories. For
example, one could argue that the Court has cited foreign courts' decisions
on the death penalty simply because those decisions happen to comport
On the other
with the desired outcome of the majority of the Justices.
hand, it seems likely that at least some members of the Court will show

39. See generally Mediating Norms, supra note 3 (analyzing the Supreme Court's approach
to comparative constitutional analysis in detail).
40. 539 U.S. 558.
41. See id. at 572-73.
42. Id. at 598 (quoting Foster v. Florida, 539 U.S. 990, n.* (2002) (mem.) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari)).
43. See Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
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much less interest in considering European views on hate speech, given
that European courts have interpreted speech rights much more narrowly
than U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence seems to permit.
In addition, proponents of transnational judicial dialogue on
constitutional issues must grapple with the popular conception of the
American Constitution, embodied in Justice Scalia's comment, "[w]e must
never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that
we are expounding." The American Constitution holds a unique place in
the American psyche: in the popular consciousness, it is the embodiment
of a uniquely American approach to liberty, justice, and the democratic
experience.
Some scholars may scoff at this popular view of the
Accordingly, in
Constitution, but U.S. judges do so at their peril.
advocating the use of foreign legal sources in constitutional analysis,
scholars and judges should devote considerable attention to ensuring that
their work is not viewed simply as replacing American constitutional
values with foreign norms.
Justice Scalia raises important concerns regarding the potential pitfalls
of U.S. court participation in transnational judicial dialogue, and he offers
a simple, straightforward solution to avoiding these problems. He argues
that U.S. courts simply should not participate at all in transnational judicial
dialogue on constitutional issues. They should not consult foreign legal
sources in their decision making, nor should they allow foreign judicial
reasoning or foreign legal norms to influence their thinking.
My view, total non-participation by U.S. courts in dialogue on
constitutional issues is impractical, unnecessary, and unwise. Justice
Scalia's conservative alternative approach misunderstands the nature of
transnational judicial dialogue. Justice Scalia fears U.S. court participation
in dialogue on constitutional issues in part because he does not see it as a
true dialogue at all. Rather, he views it as a sort of unidirectional
monologue in which foreign courts talk to U.S. courts and elaborate
foreign views on matters of constitutional law. The role of U.S. courts is
passive: they simply receive those foreign views and import foreign legal
norms into U.S. constitutional analysis. To date, the Court's approach to
foreign sources of law (in cases such as Lawrence and Atkins) may have
reinforced this conception of transnational judicial communication as a
unidirectional process of reception and importation of foreign legal norms
into the U.S. Constitution.45
U.S. court participation in transnational judicial dialogue need not be
a unidirectional process in which courts simply receive foreign legal norms.

44. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304.
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Instead, courts should approach these issues with an understanding that
transnational judicial dialogue is co-constitutive in nature. As a coconstitutive process, foreign and international law may influence and
shape domestic law; but at the same time, through participation in
dialogue, U.S. courts can ensure that American legal norms inform and
shape the development of foreign and international law as well. Thus,
from a co-constitutive perspective, consideration of foreign sources of law
need not entail automatic deference to foreign decisions.4"
Indeed, in my view, U.S. courts should become active participants in
transnational judicial dialogue on a broader range of issues, and they
should be particularly willing to engage their foreign counterparts on
issues where American legal norms differ from foreign norms. For
example, we are seeing a growing debate among the world's courts on the
regulation of transnational speech (for example, speech on the Internet).
At the heart of this debate is which countries' legal norms will govern
transnational speech: those with the most restrictive speech regimes, or
those who offer broad protections for speech? Rather than refusing to
participate in the emerging transnational judicial dialogue on speech, U.S.
courts should be engaging their foreign counterparts by citing and
discussing foreign judicial decisions, where appropriate, in their own
decisions. By considering and rejecting the very restrictive approach to
speech of many Western European courts, U.S. courts can champion at the
transnational level the American approach to broad speech protection. In
so doing, U.S. courts can ensure that American First Amendment
conceptions of speech influence the development of foreign and
international norms on transnational speech.
At this Symposium, Dean Koh and Professor Posner have highlighted
the emergence on the Supreme Court of two distinct approaches to foreign
and international sources of law - the "transnationalist" and "nationalist"
(or, in Professor Posner's view, "standard") approaches - and they have
debated which view is predominant on the Court.47 It is important to
recognize, however, that this is not simply a debate over the relevance of
foreign legal materials in the work of the U.S. courts. In a larger sense, it
is a debate over what role U.S. courts will play in the emerging
46. See generally Mediating Norms, supra note 3 (discussing the co-constitutive nature of
transnational judicial dialogue).
47. Eric Posner, TransnationalLegal Process and the Supreme Court's 2003-2004 Term:
Some Skeptical Observations, 12 TULSA J. COM'. & INT'L L. 23 (2004) (remarks in this
issue); Harold Hongju Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Lecture, the 2004 Term: The
Supreme Court Meets InternationalLaw, 12 TULSA COM'. & INT'L L. J. 1 (2004) (remarks in

this issue).
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transnational judicial dialogue among the world's courts. Moreover, the
outcome of this debate will have important implications not only for the
Court's jurisprudential approach to domestic constitutional analysis; it will
also have a tremendous impact on the ability of the Supreme Court and
other U.S. courts to influence the emerging transnational judicial dialogue,
and through that dialogue, the development of international legal norms
on a wide range of legal issues.
So-called "nationalists," like Justice Scalia and Professor Posner, raise
legitimate concerns that judges and scholars should take seriously. In this
emerging trend toward U.S. court participation in transnational judicial
dialogue, what about issues of judicial authority and legitimacy? How do
we preserve what is unique about the American constitutional experience,
while also recognizing that we can, and should, learn from the experience
of our neighbors?
I am confident that American judges can develop a principled
approach to participation in dialogue that takes into account these
concerns and strikes the right balance between these sometimes competing
values. The key in developing such an approach is to understand the
nature of transnational judicial dialogue. First, dialogue among the
world's court will proceed whether or not U.S. courts choose to participate
in it. Justice Scalia's response-total non-participation in dialogue on
constitutional issues-is certainly a viable alternative, but it imposes
significant costs in terms of U.S. courts' prestige and ability to influence
the development of constitutional thought and legal norms in other parts
of the world. A better choice is for U.S. courts to encourage more dialogue
among the world's courts on a broader range of issues, and to promote the
development of a true co-constitutive dialogue. By so doing, U.S. courts
can engage their foreign counterparts not merely to consider the relevance
of foreign legal norms to U.S. law, but to articulate and champion
American norms at the transnational level.
Several years ago, Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, a former Justice
on the Canadian Supreme Court, was asked to deliver an address here at
the University of Tulsa College of Law on "The International Impact of
the Rehnquist Court." 48 Instead, she addressed the Rehnquist Court's
declining influence over the world's constitutional courts. She commented:
In my opinion, the failure of the United States Supreme Court to take
part in the international dialogue among the courts of the world,
particularly on human rights issues, is contributing to a growing
isolation and diminished influence. The U.S. Supreme Court has failed
48. See Claire L-Heureux-Dub6, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the
InternationalImpact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15 (1998).
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to look with any regularity outside the borders of the United States for
sources of inspiration.... [Tihis tendency to look inward may well
make the judgments of U.S. courts increasingly less relevant
internationally.49
In my view, this decline in the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court is
unfortunate and unnecessary. The solution is for U.S. courts to adopt a coconstitutive approach to transnational judicial dialogue. They should
recognize that domestic law can sometimes be influenced by our
neighbors' experience, but by the same token, U.S. courts, through
participation in dialogue, can have a dramatic influence on other countries'
By adopting a co-constitutive
approaches to constitutional rights.
approach to transnational judicial dialogue, the U.S. Supreme Court can
regain its standing as the world's preeminent constitutional court, and it
can ensure that American norms of constitutional law and constitutional
rights remain influential on the world scene.

49. Id. at 37 (discussing Rehnquist Court's "failure ... to take part in the international
dialogue" as "playing one of the most important roles in the Rehnquist Court's diminished
influence, one which is entirely within the control of the Justices").

